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FOREWORD

Within the U.S. Army, this is a time of both excitement and
challenge. As immense change takes place in the global security
environment, American land power must be adapted to assure it
can continue to protect and promote national interests into the
21st century. This requires the development and integration of a
range of new technologies, concepts, and organizations. Among
these, nonlethality—using armed force in a way that minimizes
casualties—shows promise for specialized applications.
Nonlethal technology, concepts and doctrine may provide the
Army a way to retain its political utility and military effectiveness in a security environment characterized by ambiguity and
the glare of world public opinion. To explore this, the Army is
undertaking programs and initiatives which may make it the
driving force in nonlethality.
This study by Steven Metz and Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., is a
contribution to this effort. In it, they place nonlethality within its
larger strategic context and explain how it is related to the
revolution in military affairs. They then assess the arguments for
and against the integration of nonlethality into American
doctrine and procedures. Finally, they offer operational concepts
which could serve as the basis for doctrine and for tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report
as a contribution to the ongoing process of refining American land
power.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

The nature of the contemporary strategic environment
has generated much interest in nonlethality among
American defense policymakers and military leaders. While
cases can be made both for and against integration of
nonlethality into military doctrine and strategy, proponents
of nonlethality have a stronger case.
With appropriate forms of technology, doctrine,
operational concepts, and rules of engagement, nonlethality
could increase the utility of the U.S. armed forces during
this era of ambiguous conflict. Nonlethality could provide
political decision-makers and military commanders with
means to dominate the portion of the spectrum of force that
lies between diplomacy and lethality. In doing so, they will
be better able to apply the precise psychological pressure
required to modify an adversary’s behavior in a certain way.
Nonlethality can be used to deter or preempt conflict,
separate belligerents and allow for “cooling off,” encourage
negotiation, protect noncombatants, facilitate disaster
relief and humanitarian assistance operations, enhance the
effectiveness of lethal weapons and other instruments of
national power, and reduce risks to U.S. forces.
Nonetheless, there are several cautions associated with
the use of nonlethality. The apparent avoidance of political
risks that nonlethality provides can delay necessary debate
and the making of tough policy decisions. The pursuit of
nonlethality by the United States could be viewed as
hegemonic by other countries. Nonlethality could
compromise the principle of military necessity if it
encourages field commanders to be less discriminating in
distinguishing military targets from nonmilitary locations
and populations. Finally, nonlethality could lead to
increased violations of sovereignty.
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From an operational perspective, nonlethality appears
to have more applicability at the lower end of the conflict
spectrum. Nonlethal capabilities should be included in
plans for the application of flexible deterrent options
(FDOs). In that role, nonlethality can add to the
effectiveness of diplomatic, economic, informational, and
other military FDOs. It is critical, however, that nonlethal
FDOs be crafted to avoid inadvertently placing the United
states on the “slippery slope” to involvement in a series of
peripheral bloodlettings that might undercut American
public support for a strategy of global engagement. In that
regard, it will sometimes be necessary to clearly announce
that U.S. forces will resort to lethal force if nonlethality fails
to have the desired effect. In other situations, it will be more
prudent to create deliberate ambiguity on the willingness to
resort to deadly force.
Within the context of military operations other than war
(MOOTW), nonlethality should be considered for force and
site protection, riot and crowd control, separation of
belligerents, interdiction of resupply efforts or offensives,
operational persuasion, and security assistance. For
small-scale conflicts, nonlethality can help insure mission
accomplishment while controlling and ultimately reducing
the level of violence. Although nonlethality will be most
useful at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, it has
significant applicability for major theater warfare. It that
regard, nonlethality should be employed to enhance the
effectiveness and efficiency of lethal weapons. Nonlethal
capabilities also can be used to measure a certain dose of
punishment to aggressor states and to facilitate post-war
reconstruction. Finally, nonlethal capabilities can be used
for direct action missions that might include strategic
preemption, hostage rescue, and anti-terrorist operations.
Nonlethality will not create difficult rules of engagement
(ROE) problems. Rather, nonlethality will enable commanders to tailor better rules and operational procedures
that ensure force, proportionate to that necessitated by the
situation and mission, is available and usable. Consevi

quently, decisions that must be made by field forces
concerning the appropriate level of force to be applied will be
less ambiguous. Rather than adding complexity to ROE
issues, nonlethality should be seen as providing
unprecedented fidelity in the application of force to
accomplish a wider set of legitimate missions.
Nonlethality will not remove violence from armed
conflict. Nonlethal capabilities will not obviate lethal forces,
at least not for the foreseeable future. In fact, in some cases,
nonlethality should be used to enhance the effects of lethal
weapons. Still, nonlethality can sufficiently increase the
utility of American land power in this era of ambiguity and
uncertainty to warrant its pursuit.
Recommendations.

•
•

•

The U.S. armed forces, particularly the Army and
Marines, should develop operational concepts for the
employment of nonlethality.
These operational concepts should not be constrained
by extant capabilities or those under development.
The concepts must drive technological investigations.
In particular, research is needed on wide-area, standoff non-lethal systems, and on variable intensity nonlethal systems so that commanders have a true
rheostatic capability rather than an “either/or” choice
between lethal and non-lethal means.
The Army should begin research and development of
data bases to support assessments of the psychological impact which certain actions are likely to have
in certain cultures. This will help commanders to
select the appropriate circumstances for the use of
nonlethal weapons and guide the research and
development community as they refine nonlethal
weapons, thus linking operational imperatives and
technology.
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•

•

•

Once concepts and technology are in place, the
Standing Rules Of Engagement should be reviewed
for possible modification or supplementation to
ensure full realization of the additional capabilities
nonlethality has to offer.
Joint doctrine setting forth the operational concepts
for the use of nonlethality in design of operations
should be developed and promulgated. Service
doctrine should follow suit.
Policymakers should remain ever-mindful of the
cautions associated with the application of nonlethality.
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NONLETHALITY AND
AMERICAN LAND POWER:
STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Introduction.
As the concept of a revolution in military affairs gained
acceptance among strategic thinkers, agreement emerged
on its essential characteristics. Speed and precision are the
keys, with both made possible by vastly increased
knowledge. Speed includes both mental quickness—the
ability to gather and assess accurate information and make
decisions in a short period of time—and rapidity of
movement and fire. Precision entails limiting unintended or
undesired effects, whether through accuracy or by weapons
specifically designed to avoid such effects. It is both an
economizing measure and a response to changes in the
ethical and political context of armed conflict. While most
attention within the realm of precision has focused on the
dramatic increases in the accuracy of modern weapons,
nonlethality also shows promise for limiting unintended or
undesired effects, and for allowing military forces to attain a
degree of psychological precision to complement physical
precision. (See Figure 1.)

The Revolution
in Military Affairs
KNOWLEDGE

Speed
Decisionmaking

Precision

Movement
and Reaction

Accuracy

Figure 1.
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Nonlethality

The brief history of nonlethality in the United States is
part of the immense conceptual and organizational change
that followed the end of the Cold War. Prompted by lobbying
from the U.S. Global Strategy Council, a conservative think
tank chaired by former CIA deputy director Ray S. Cline,
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney established a Non-Lethal
Warfare Study Group in March 1991.1 This group, under the
control of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul D.
Wolfowitz and chaired by Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, Assistant
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning,
eventually supported a wide range of policies and programs
to stoke the development and fielding of nonlethal weapons.
Convinced of the revolutionary potential of nonlethality, it
advocated a nonlethal defense initiative modeled after the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Within the Pentagon, this was
too much change too fast. When Donald Yockey, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, argued that the
existing programming architecture could adequately
handle nonlethal weapons, his opposition helped to blunt
adoption of the study group’s findings.2 Nonlethal weapons
then moved to the Pentagon’s back burner during the
transition from the Bush to the Clinton administration.
Soon the involvement of the U.S. military in Bosnia,
Somalia, and Haiti as well as the disaster at the Branch
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas resuscitated interest.
This time, though, the impetus came from military field
commanders rather than strategic theorists. Following his
experience as commander of American forces protecting the
final withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia,
U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni
became the prime advocate for the development and fielding
of nonlethal weapons.3 The 1995 Commission on Roles and
Missions, by identifying counterproliferation, information
warfare, peace operations, and operations other than war as
high priorities, provided further political ammunition for
advocates of nonlethality.4 And, in 1996 General John J.
Sheehan, commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command, added
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his support in an important speech to the Non-lethal
Defense Conference II.5
By 1996, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict had
produced a foundation policy document—Department of
Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.3, Policy for Non-lethal
Weapons—with Charles F. Swett as the lead author. Also in
1996, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology designated the Commandant of the Marine
Corps executive agent for the program. The Policy for NonLethal Weapons defined nonlethal weapons as those
“explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to
incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing
fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired
damage to property and the environment,” and established
a policy framework for their use. 6 A January 1997
memorandum of agreement among the military services
established the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate
which reports to the Marine Corps Commandant. By 1998
this organization had developed a Joint Concept for
Non-lethal Weapons.7 Attempts also are underway to link
U.S. thinking on nonlethal weapons to that of allied nations.
The NATO Defense Research Group, for instance, has held a
series of seminars to find common ground among the
Alliance members.
Driven, in part, by General Zinni’s influence, the U.S.
Marine Corps has been the most active service in assessing
and developing nonlethal weapons. Some of the best
analyses have come from Marine authors.8 While the Air
Force has shown less institutional interest in nonlethal
weapons, astute strategic thinking has come from Air Force
authors or been published in Air Force sources.9 Most work
on the strategic, political, and normative dimensions of
nonlethality, though, has taken place outside the
Department of Defense. Two of the most persistent
proponents have been Chris and Janet Morris, the writers
who initially convinced Ray Cline to lobby the Department
of Defense. Additionally, John B. Alexander, former
3

program manager and leader of disabling technologies
research at Los Alamos National Laboratory and now
director of science liaison at the National Institute for
Discovery Sciences, has been an active supporter.10
A growing literature on nonlethal weapons is emerging
in the strategic studies community and now includes
important books by Nick Lewer and Steven Schofield, and
by David A. Morehouse.11 Prestigious think tanks such as
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Council on
Foreign Relations have studied the military implications of
nonlethality.12 More recently, the mass media has joined in
with stories in U.S. News and World Report and a
British-produced documentary that is frequently broadcast
on the cable Discovery Channel.13 And, there has been some
interest within the U.S. Congress. Senator Bob Smith,
chairman of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, became a vocal
supporter arguing that nonlethal weapons, “can offer US
and NATO troops the capability to manage, contain, and
diffuse certain volatile and low-intensity situations.”14
Although the Army has been as energetic at the tactical
level as the Marines, it could contribute more to the
strategic and operational level debate, particularly given
the change underway in the nature and use of American
land power. In the current strategic environment, land
power is used to prevent hostile states from coercing or
intimidating U.S. friends and allies by deterring,
preempting, or defeating aggressors. It is also employed to
help protect friendly states from substate or nonstate
enemies and to facilitate humanitarian relief and conflict
resolution during internal violence or disorder. To do these
things in an increasingly complex security environment
demands creativity and new concepts. Nonlethality has the
potential to be one of these concepts.
To understand the strategic and operational functions of
nonlethality, senior military leaders must place it in proper
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perspective. This study is intended to support such
understanding. Rather than approaching military
capabilities as being divided into lethal and nonlethal, we
see them as a continuum based on the intensity and
reversibility of force. (See Figure 2.) Furthermore, this
study stresses nonlethality rather than specific nonlethal
weapons since, at the strategic and operational levels,
weapons themselves are less relevant than their context,
use, and implications. The study does not attempt to provide
detail on the characteristics of weapons that are fielded or
under development, or on the tactical use of nonlethal
weapons.15 However, we do contend that operational
decisions involving nonlethality must be made with an
astute understanding of their strategic context. Therefore,
we link the strategic context of nonlethality with
operational concepts. While the concepts might provide a
framework for doctrine and tactics, techniques, and
procedures, we will not attempt specific doctrinal or
procedural recommendations. Instead, we will focus on
three core issues: (1) What accounts for the growing interest
in nonlethality among American strategists and
policymakers? (2) Should the United States fully adopt
nonlethal operational concepts? and, (3) If the United States
does adopt nonlethal operational concepts, what should
they be?
Nuclear
weapon

Certain
death

Lethal Force
Some
Extent deaths
Less Lethal Force
of
Very
Damage unpleasant
Nonlethal Force
Minimal
(nuisance)

Sponge grenade
Diplomacy, economic sanctions, psychological operations

Very short

Reversible

Length of Effect
Figure 2.
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Permanent

What Accounts for the Growing Interest
in Nonlethality?
The growing interest in nonlethality on the part of
American policymakers and military strategists is a logical
response to changes in the global security environment.
Basically, it is part of the desire to preserve and enhance the
political utility of military force. To have utility, a military
force must be capable of attaining its objectives and be
politically usable. If American political leaders feel that the
use of force entails unacceptable political costs or pressures,
the utility of even conventional forces will be limited. A
number of features of the contemporary security
environment may give armed forces equipped with both
lethal and nonlethal weapons greater political utility than
those which only have lethal means.
One such feature is the pervasiveness and strategic
significance of low-level, protracted substate or internal
conflict. “Less than war” or “other than war” violence has
always existed but was overshadowed by traditional war
between the great powers during most of the 20th century. In
the post-Cold War era, though, large-scale war between
great powers has become unlikely. American military
prowess deters astute enemies from traditional aggression.
Only a truly stupid opponent like Saddam Hussein would
even consider it. Global interdependence has also made
traditional state-on-state war less likely by rendering
governments more vulnerable to political pressure and
economic sanctions. And the fact that most of the world’s
major powers (save China) are, to a greater or lesser extent,
democracies lowers the chances of traditional state-on-state
war.16
But even as major conventional conflict becomes rare,
“less-than-war” violence, instigated by those immune to
world public opinion or willing to pay the political and
economic costs associated with making war, has become
common. The world is not yet “a kinder and gentler place.”
Most contemporary armed conflict pits substate entities in a
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struggle for territory, power, or both. Violence is primal,
with battle lines and alliances based on ethnicity, clan,
religion, or race rather than ideology. Contemporary
conflict tends to be over what one is rather than what one
believes.
Primal conflict is steeped in political and moral
ambiguity, much of it deliberate. Ambiguity provides cover
and camouflage for those who wish to use violence while
minimizing its political costs. It is not clear whether the
traditional rules and laws of armed conflict apply to
less-than-war violence. It is often unclear who is the
aggressor and who is the victim in contemporary ambiguous
conflict. The existing system for the control of warfare,
centered on the United Nations and championed by the
United States, is predicated on the concept of aggression.
There are rules and procedures for stopping it. When an
aggressor cannot be identified or when both (or all)
protagonists in a conflict are equally culpable, the system
breaks down. Furthermore, militias, armed gangs, and
terrorist cells dominate contemporary ambiguous conflict.
This makes it difficult to separate the leadership and armed
forces from noncombatants.
However frustrating, ambiguous, low-level conflict
cannot be disregarded by political leaders and strategists.
Electronic communication, whether through the media or
the Internet, mobilizes constituencies for nearly every
conflict anywhere in the world. Passions can be inflamed,
support or lobbying organizations formed, and calls for
action spread in hours or days. Not all conflicts capture
global attention—witness the bloody but largely ignored
civil wars underway in Sudan, Sierra Leone, or
Tajikistan—but all have the potential to do so. In part this is
because modern low-level conflicts can easily spread and
escalate. The 1996-97 civil war in Zaire/Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for instance, sparked refugee
problems and armed violence in the neighboring Congo
Republic and a number of other nearby nations. The
possibility of escalation is omnipresent in Bosnia and
7

Kosovo. The list goes on. At the same time, the booming
global market in sophisticated weapons—a result of the end
of the Cold War which left huge arms stockpiles spread
around the world and deflated traditional markets
—increased the violence associated with ambiguous,
low-level conflict.
When low-level, ambiguous violence began to dominate
the contemporary security environment, the core objectives
of military force shifted. Primal hatreds are so strong and so
savage that negotiation is difficult. Each side tends to seek
total victory, and is often willing to make immense sacrifices
to achieve it. In such an environment, the purpose of
military power—particularly external power—is compellence.17 Unless outside powers are willing to allow the
stronger side to win, force must be used to end the violence
and prepare for a negotiated resolution. This is an historic
shift in the raison d’etre of military power.
One characteristic of intervention in ambiguous,
low-level conflict is the need for psychological precision. In
traditional state-on-state warfare the goal is to break the
enemy’s will, often by simply destroying targets of value
until the enemy submits. By contrast, low-level, ambiguous
conflict demands psychological precision aimed at
cultivating desired attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs. Over
time, pummeling targets might break an enemy’s will to
resist, but initially tends to steel resolve and amplify
hostility. It cannot be fine-tuned for specific psychological
effects such as encouraging a group to support certain
leaders or policies. Standoff warfare, with its potential
precision of physical effects but inherent imprecision of
psychological effects, is a psychological axe rather than a
scalpel. It does not work in low-level, ambiguous conflicts.
Admittedly, having the capability for psychological
precision does not guarantee that military actions will have
the desired psychological effects. That requires deep
cultural understanding to know what actions will generate
what attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions. But the absence of
psychological precision will almost always guarantee
8

failure in ambiguous, hands-on warfare. This is a prime
reason for the current interest in nonlethality.
Ambiguity is not the only defining feature of the
contemporary security environment. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them
is also central. Currently, at least 25 countries have or are
developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the
means to deliver them.18 Soon weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic or cruise missiles will be common. Preventing
or postponing hostile states or organizations from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery
systems will be an important task for the U.S. military and
those of other states in coming decades. And, during crises
or armed conflict, preventing the actual use of weapons of
mass destruction will be even more critical.
All of these changes in the global security environment
have affected the way American leaders seek to sustain
public support for global engagement and the exercise of
military power. Since the end of the Cold War, the Bush and
Clinton administrations have remained determined to
apply power to promote stability, even in regions without a
tradition of American involvement or clear, tangible
national interests. American leaders also have developed a
deep belief in the advantages of early engagement in a
crisis, in preemption, and in shaping the security environment rather than simply responding to it. If the “lesson of
Bosnia” for U.S. policymakers was that an effective
international response to regional conflict usually requires
direct American involvement, the “lesson of Rwanda” was
that it is better to intervene early rather than late.
The problem is that the public and some members of
Congress are not convinced by the administration’s activist
arguments. Given this, sustaining public support for
engagement in low-level conflict has been a key objective of
the Clinton administration. This requires minimizing the
risk to the U.S. military forces through participating in a
coalition where the risks and costs are shared, by the use of
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overwhelming force where appropriate, or by the
development and use of appropriate force protection
technology (the solution closest to the American heart). This
helps to explain the Clinton administration’s interest in
nonlethality.
Should the United States Pursue Nonlethality?
While there is great interest in nonlethality in the
Pentagon and among strategic thinkers, cases can be made
both for and against the full development and integration of
nonlethal weapons. Understanding these is vital for wise
policy choices.
The Case in Favor of Nonlethality. For the U.S. military,
crisis response in politically ambiguous settings has
supplanted warfighting as the most common military
mission. Force is employed to prevent violence, allow a
“cooling down period,” compel the antagonists to negotiate,
and, by protecting noncombatants, help avoid humanitarian disasters or refugee crises that might spread the
conflict. Nonlethality may decrease the risk to U.S. forces
and help avoid criticism that would result from
noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.
The central concept here is the perceived gap between
diplomacy and force.19 Traditionally, Americans have
considered force as a last resort, only to be used when other
means have been exhausted and important national
interests are threatened by an enemy. The idea that there is
a rigid distinction between peace, where force is not
appropriate, and war, where it is, limits the options
available to national leaders. If the only alternatives are
diplomacy or full-bore military action with its implication of
overwhelming force and decisive victory, national leaders
will have to eschew early intervention in a crisis or attempt
to paint it as a significant threat that justifies major
military action. But early intervention in a crisis facilitates
resolution and limits the suffering it brings.20 To rule it out
means that the American military will often enter
10

ambiguous conflicts only after they have become intractable
or impassioned. By the same token, overselling the
American stake in a conflict in order to mobilize public
support can be the first step toward a Vietnam-style
imbroglio. What policymakers need is a way to use force that
is effective but proportionate to American stakes in a
conflict.
The need to finely tune the level of force used in
ambiguous conflict reflects the fact that electronic
communications have made much of armed conflict into
theater.21 The warring parties are like the actors in a play,
interacting with each other while playing to an audience
that includes their own supporters, potential allies, and
global public opinion. Since antagonists in an ambiguous,
low-level conflict often do not want external intervention,
they will attempt to make it as costly as possible. Outsiders
who do intervene must make their key audiences, including
domestic ones, view the intervention as appropriate and
worthwhile. Nonlethality might provide a way to do this.
To sustain support for an intervention, the United
States must make it clear that its forces are using the
minimum amount of force, and must take steps to avoid
turning local people against the intervention. Nonlethality
might give tactical commanders a “rheostatic” capability,
allowing them to fine-tune the amount of force necessary for
force protection and for the accomplishment of other
missions such as physical separation of combatants or the
distribution of humanitarian relief.22 America’s enemies
would find it more difficult to undercut public support for
American involvement by killing U.S. troops or by hiding
among noncombatants.23
Nonlethality may offer a vital counter to the sort of
asymmetric strategies that America’s enemies are likely to
pursue in ambiguous conflicts. In the future, American
forces often will face opponents whose leaders went to
college in the United States. Even more will have access to
electronic media and entertainment from the United States
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and thus have at least rudimentary insights into the
American mind. Based on their understanding of the
American mindset, many enemies will seek to kill or wound
U.S. forces and will shield themselves among noncombatants, particularly in urban areas. Nonlethality could
trump these techniques, protecting U.S. forces while
retaining the “moral high ground.”
Finally, nonlethality might support efforts to neutralize
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics production, storage,
or transportation facilities, forces preparing for
conventional cross-border attacks, or terrorist support
infrastructure. Currently, rules regarding sovereignty limit
the conditions under which the United States strikes
preemptively at such targets. Nonlethality might provide a
way to neutralize the production of weapons of mass
destruction without the contamination that would result
from a conventional attack.24 Given this, nonlethal weapons
that could effectively destroy machinery and facilities with
limited collateral damage or casualties—whether delivered
by air, missile, or special forces—might make preemptive
intervention more politically palatable, augmenting
deterrence and saving countless American lives.
The Case against Nonlethality. Nonlethality is not
without costs, risks, and possible unintended side effects.
For example, nonlethality can be seen as an attempt to
avoid tough policy decisions associated with the use of force.
If policymakers believe that military force can be used
bloodlessly, they might be tempted to intervene in
ambiguous conflicts where no tangible U.S. interests are at
stake. Phrased differently, nonlethality might make all
interventions appear low cost and thus cloud the judgement
of policymakers. Similarly, if the public and Congress
believe that the costs of intervention are low, they might not
play their natural (and healthy) role of skeptic. Just as the
defendant in a criminal case must be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is a good thing for American
policymakers to be similarly certain that the military
intervention is necessary and appropriate. Nonlethality
12

might cloud such decisions. If the costs of intervention are
not clear up front, the result can be fiascos like Somalia
where the parties to the conflict recognize the fragility of
American public support for the intervention, escalate the
violence, and end up damaging U.S. prestige and eroding
public support for further humanitarian intervention.
The phrase “nonlethal weapons” can be misleading to
the public. As the Joint Concept for Non-lethal Weapons
states, “[n]oncombatant casualties, to include serious
injuries and fatalities, will continue to be a regrettable but
unavoidable outcome when military power is employed,
whether or not non-lethal weapons are available.”25
Anything powerful enough to affect a determined opponent
can cause serious harm or even death. Nonlethal weapons
are designed for use against healthy adults, but when they
are used for crowd control or in urban conflict, the targets
will often be the young, old, sick, or weak. Some may die.
Even anti-materiel weapons are likely to cause deaths as
planes crash, vehicles wreck, trains derail, and power grids
fail, leaving hospitals dysfunctional. The American public,
when faced with television pictures of dead civilians when
they expected none, may lose its stomach for intervention.
Even if nonlethality works perfectly, it might not always
decrease regional violence. Sadly, many internal conflicts
must run their bloody course before the antagonists are
ready for resolution. Serious negotiations only occur when
both sides tire of the violence. Outside intervention may be
like holding the lid on a boiling pot and end up postponing
resolution rather than facilitating it. And, in a time when
many states are becoming leery of American power, any
steps taken by the United States to make intervention
easier, including the development and deployment of
nonlethal weapons, will increase distrust and perhaps even
hostility. For many foreigners, to transform what is already
a peerless military into something even more effective
suggests hidden and insidious motives.
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Once U.S. forces equipped with nonlethal weapons do
intervene in an ambiguous conflict, nonlethality might
increase the level of violence rather than lower it. Groups
targeted by nonlethal weapons may escalate rather than
submit. If U.S. military targets are protected with nonlethality, opponents may simply seek softer targets,
perhaps American civilians in the country (such as aid
workers), U.S. facilities outside the area of conflict, or sites
in the United States itself which can be struck by terrorists.
Nonlethality also may erode deterrence as opponents
develop a tolerance for the unpleasant effects.
Nonlethality might contribute to short-term, tactical
success by allowing troops to protect themselves from an
angry crowd or clear an urban area of enemy forces, but it
might bring long-term, strategic problems by making
enemies believe that the costs of opposing the United States
are acceptable. And nonlethality used against materiel
rather than people may prove more expensive than
conventional destruction in the long term, requiring
repeated applications. Generally it is easier for an enemy to
repair a system or facility struck by nonlethal weapons than
one utterly destroyed by conventional munitions.
At the tactical level, nonlethality might lead commanders to be less discriminating in distinguishing
legitimate military targets from unacceptable ones, thus
weakening or circumventing the law of armed conflict.
Nonlethality could generate a “when in doubt, shoot”
mentality. Conversely, the presence of nonlethal weapons
could lead tactical commanders to postpone the use of lethal
force longer than they might otherwise, thus exposing their
troops to increased danger. Nonlethal weapons could
further complicate the decisions that tactical commanders
must make in very stressful conditions. And, nonlethal
weapons could increase the load that already overburdened
troops must carry and add new maintenance and logistics
requirements.
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The availability of nonlethal weapons for preemption
against weapons of mass destruction sites or production
facilities, narcotics production, storage, or transportation
facilities, forces preparing for conventional cross-border
attacks, or terrorist support infrastructure might lead
political leaders to forget that the use of nonlethal force is
still a violation of sovereignty and should only be done under
the most dire conditions. Even at the tactical level,
nonlethality moves the United States into unexplored
ethical terrain. Some technology that appears nonlethal,
such as blinding lasers, has been deemed to be in violation of
human rights. 26 Other potentially useful nonlethal
technologies are or may be prohibited by the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons
Convention.27
If the United States Chooses to Develop Nonlethal
Operational Concepts, What Should They Be?
Whether to pursue nonlethality is a strategic decision
based in part on operational considerations. If such a
decision is made, the development of nonlethal operational
concepts should be guided by two overarching considerations. First, nonlethality is not a discrete and distinct way
of conducting military operations. Rather, it is a term that
represents that portion of the spectrum of force between
persuasive diplomacy and capabilities consciously designed
to be deadly.28 Consequently, some nonlethal systems might
be a small step removed from negotiation. Their impact will
be reversible and tolerable. Even damage to materiel may
be easily and quickly repaired. On the other hand, some
nonlethal capabilities may be distinguished from lethal
systems only by the fact that they were not primarily
designed to cause death. The damage done to materiel and
targeted systems may be as irreversible or difficult to repair
as that done by conventional munitions. Nonlethal
operational concepts logically will range from those
intended to merely persuade to those designed to compel
desired behavior.
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Second, even though the principles of military necessity
and proportionality were developed to constrain lethal
warfare, they equally apply to nonlethality. Causing people
to convulse uncontrollably while sorting out the combatants, for instance, would be just as much a violation of the
law of armed conflict as using a rifle to wound them.
International law recognizes that some noncombatant
casualties and “collateral damage” are unavoidable. But the
principle of proportionality demands that the suffering of
war, particularly on the part of noncombatants, be minimized. Thus, the development of nonlethal operational
concepts that provide for the application of more effective
force to achieve less critical military objectives may be more
difficult than one might suspect.
While the main rationale for the use of nonlethality at
the strategic level is to enhance the political utility of force,
at the tactical and operational level it is psychological
precision. The greater the need for psychological precision,
the greater the value of nonlethality. In large-scale
warfighting where the objective is decisive victory and the
major psychological state desired is the collapse of the
enemy’s will to resist, nonlethality will play a secondary
role, supplementing lethal force. In ambiguous conflict
where greater psychological precision is required, nonlethality may be secondary or primary, depending on the
specific situation and the psychological makeup of those
against whom nonlethals will be used. The core task for the
operational commander and his staff is to discern what
specific attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions he wants to
create among the parties to the conflict. Examples may
include:

•
•

The United States is benign now, but will punish
actions at variance with the desired ones, especially
the use of violence.
The United States is not hostile toward the local
people, but will punish combatants.
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•
•
•

The United States is showing great restraint.
The United States is able to protect its forces even in
the face of efforts to harm them.
The United States has the capacity to counter
proliferation, terrorism, narcotrafficking, and
aggression even given the political restraints of global
leadership.

This list is notional. The specific psychological objectives
will vary from operation to operation. The appropriate role
of nonlethality and the conditions for the use of nonlethal
weapons will be determined, in part, by these psychological
objectives.
Given that precision of effect is a core characteristic of
the ongoing revolution in military affairs and that
nonlethality is one way of augmenting such precision, the
U.S. military is likely to pursue the development of 21st
century operational concepts based on types of operations.
Nonlethal Flexible Deterrent Options. At one end of the
operational continuum, nonlethality should be integrated
into flexible deterrent options (FDOs). FDOs are a blend of
steps taken to deter threats to U.S. interests. They usually
include both military and nonmilitary actions. Nonlethality
can create a firewall between adversaries and minimize
confrontation, thus allowing effective diplomacy.
Nonlethality may also limit the chances of escalation. In the
first case, the rapidity with which the non-lethal FDOs
could be introduced would be key. In the second case, timing
would be critical.
Nonlethality could be more appropriate than lethal force
in FDOs that seek to persuade rather than compel. Still, to
deter effectively, nonlethality must inhibit movement
toward confrontation by exacting a sufficient price. For
example, nonlethality could be employed to interdict the
marshaling of resources and personnel necessary for
aggression. The nonlethality component of FDOs should
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raise the costs of aggression without putting U.S. personnel
or noncombatants at significant risk. Nonlethality alone
may not accomplish this, but may do so in conjunction with
other military and nonmilitary actions. Particularly,
nonlethality can enhance the effectiveness of diplomacy and
coalition-building as well as economic and informational
FDOs. “The effectiveness of sanctions,” writes Joseph
Siniscalchi, “can be significantly enhanced by concurrent
employment of non-lethal weapons.”29 To support the other
elements of national power, force based on nonlethality
must not be perceived as heavy-handed and must not fuel
the escalatory propensities of potential belligerents. It
should be seen as stabilizing and de-escalating. The
operational methods by which nonlethality is used will play
a major role in determining whether it is able to play this
stabilizing role.
When part of FDOs, nonlethality must avoid the
“slippery slope” of intervention. This is not to say that
nonlethality may be applied only in situations where deadly
force would be used if necessary. To hold that would be to
deny the increased utility of the U.S. armed forces that
nonlethality promises. Likewise, there should be no policy
that nonlethality must be employed before resort to lethal
force. The concept is not for a “graduated response” but for a
“graded” application of force that is reasonably certain to
achieve the desired deterrence.
In some situations it would be prudent to send a clear
signal that if nonlethality proves unsuccessful, resort to
lethal force will be certain. Where one or more of the
antagonists are anxious for the confrontation to assume
lethal dimensions, however, such a pronouncement would
provide a road map for escalation and U.S. armed forces
should not promise that lethal force only will be used for
self-defense. A better alternative may be deliberate
ambiguity as to whether, or to what extent, the United
States would be willing to escalate. Nonlethality is not
intended to obviate lethal force but may, in some situations,
supplant lethal weapons.
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In order for nonlethal FDOs to have the intended
psychological impact, they must be supported by in-depth
intelligence. Commanders designing FDOs must
understand the mindset, values, and motives of potential
opponents. This will require a staff rich in regional
experience and cultural awareness which can accurately
assess the psychological impact that specific weapons are
likely to have under certain conditions. A data base of
culturally-sensitive psychological research would be a
valuable planning tool for FDOs and other uses of
nonlethality. In developing FDOs, commanders must avoid
nonlethal measures that are likely to evoke lethal
responses. A nonlethal capability should not be included as
part of an FDO unless it is more likely to reduce tension
than exacerbate it.
Nonlethality and Military Operations Other Than War.
Nonlethality has operational utility beyond deterrence.
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as
humanitarian assistance, military support to civilian
authorities, peace operations, and noncombatant
evacuation operations will provide fruitful areas for
nonlethality. Most MOOTW involve precisely the kind of
ambiguous conflicts where nonlethality can have the
greatest utility. In fact, nonlethal weapons should be part of
the standard mission package in MOOTW. They should
range from low- to mid-intensity, and from very short effect
to reversible but lasting effects. (See Figure 3.) For
MOOTW, nonlethality would have a number of functions:
Force and Site Protection. Effective force and site
protection requires the ability to quickly and efficiently
distinguish, segregate, and neutralize threats, even when
they are interspersed among or exploit civilians. The
standard procedure for force and site protection in MOOTW
should be a layered defense, the outer ring of which should
be nonlethal but the inner parts of which should be
increasingly lethal. The fact that nonlethal measures are
backed by lethal ones should be clearly signaled. For force
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and site protection, nonlethal capabilities augment deadly
force, but do not replace it.30
Riot and Crowd Control. A concept for dispersing crowds
and controlling riots is a necessary complement to force and
site protection. The concept should provide general
incentives for the crowd to disperse peacefully while
creating special inducements for agitators to desist. The
timeliness and persuasiveness of the general incentive
must be commensurate with the intensity and potential
destructiveness of the mob mentality exhibited by the
crowd. Crowds that have the potential for violence but have
not yet reached that stage might be dispersed through
patient dialogue. On the other hand, a riotous mob might
require immediate treatment by nonlethal capabilities
further up the force continuum. This means that U.S. forces
should have access to nonlethal weapons with varying
intensity of effects. Those for use in, say, humanitarian
relief operations against an agitated but nonviolent crowd
should be “nuisance” style weapons with effects that are
quickly reversible and which cause only limited discomfort.
Those for use against a dangerous crowd would clearly need
to be of a higher intensity.
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Agitators require more particularized treatment not
only because their actions fuel the emotions of the present
crowd, but also because they can repeat their incitement at
a later time or in a different place. Their permanent
dissuasion, therefore, is key to long-term stability. In most
cases, removal of agitators will not be feasible before the
crowd disperses. Still, in a manner somewhat analogous to
separating combatants from noncombatants, agitators
must be identified, temporarily silenced, and marked for
future apprehension. This can be accomplished by
combining appropriate nonlethal doctrine, training, and
capabilities. Some extant nonlethal weapons have shown
great utility for general riot and crowd control during
humanitarian relief and peace support operations. Others
need further testing. Advanced and more effective
capabilities are under development, some of which will
enable better targeting of agitators. As with force and site
protection, nonlethal weapons used in crowd control should,
under most conditions, be backed by lethal weapons, or at
least the belief that American forces are prepared to
escalate to lethal force must be implanted in the crowd.31
Nonlethal weapons should also have adequate range so that
soldiers using them can keep a safe distances from hostile
crowds.
According to the Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons,
“the capability to resort to deadly force must always remain
an inherent right of individuals in instances of self-defense,
as well as an inherent responsibility of commanders when
the mission and circumstances warrant it.”32 This policy
and the means of effecting it must be obvious to the crowd.
That suggests that the forces equipped with nonlethal and
lethal weapons should remain close enough for mutual
support, but should be distinguishable by the crowd. The
precise configuration will, of course, depend on the
circumstances.
Physical Separation through Buffers or Demilitarized
Zones. In low-level conflict, successful negotiations often
require physically separating the parties to a conflict. The
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goal is to diminish passion and hatred. Nonlethal
capabilities could be used by peacekeeping forces to initially
separate and then maintain segregation of belligerent
groups without endangering negotiations. A mix of
capabilities including anti-personnel, anti-materiel,
counter-mobility, and barrier systems can be brought to
bear to reduce substantially the need to interpose U.S.
forces between opposing factions. The actual nonlethal
capabilities employed will depend on the specific
operational conditions, but their use must appear
even-handed.
Interdiction and Isolation. There will be times during
MOOTW that U.S. forces will need to prevent the supply or
resupply of parties to a conflict and isolate them from
supporters. In many situations, it would be beneficial to do
so with as few casualties as possible to avoid escalating
tensions and increasing hostility from whomever is
providing the supplies. Nonlethal capabilities can perform
such interdiction in a manner that is neither threatening
nor provocative, but seen as preventive. Air- or artillerydelivered nonlethals could be used to misdirect or redirect
shipments, spoil supplies and disable equipment in staging
areas, and interdict resupply convoys.
Operational Persuasion. In peace support operations,
there may be times that parties to the conflict need to be
persuaded to stop certain types of behavior or pursue
negotiations more seriously. Using deadly force for this
risks escalation and might cause negotiations to break
down. Nonlethality provides a way for U.S. forces to
convince a recalcitrant party to change behavior while
limiting the chances of escalation or the dilution of
international support for the operation. The American
“stick,” in other words, should be no bigger nor threatening
than necessary but must be sufficient. A wide variety of
nonlethal capabilities can be combined to form an
operational pattern designed to accomplish such strategic
objectives.
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Security Assistance. One of the most important
activities of the U.S. military is its efforts to preempt conflict
and shape the security environment by providing advice
and assistance to friendly states. Some of those countries
face substate or nonstate challenges. Since nonlethality is
perfectly suited for counterinsurgency and other measures
directed against internal threats, the U.S. armed forces
should be prepared to provide advice and assistance on the
integration of nonlethal capabilities into plans for providing
internal security. The same holds for American assistance
to U.N. peacekeeping forces or those from other friendly
states. Nonlethality, in other words, should be an integral
element of U.S. security assistance and nation assistance
programs. Low-technology nonlethal capabilities designed
for close action may be most appropriate. Other types of
nonlethal technology may be inappropriate for transfer to
other states for maintaining internal stability.
Small-scale Conflict. There has been little discussion
concerning the use of nonlethality in small-scale conflicts
(SSCs). While there may be some hesitation among
observers about the utility of such weapons in actual
conflict, we believe that they can play a useful role.
Nonlethal weapons can be used to supplement the use of
lethal force, largely in ways already outlined in the previous
discussion of MOOTW. Additionally, given the need to
prevent small-scale conflicts from spreading, nonlethals can
be used as a means to defuse, rather than escalate,
situations (e.g., crowd control or immobilizing hostile
groups). In some cases, they may be used in lieu of more
lethal effects (e.g., disabling vehicles instead of destroying
them). Third, nonlethals can be used to supplement and
enhance the use of lethal force. The guiding principle behind
the employment of nonlethal means should remain using
the lowest level of force necessary to achieve the objective
with acceptable risks to friendly forces and noncombatants.
The use of nonlethal weapons in SSCs is not without
cautions, however. As U.S. Army Chief of Staff General
Dennis J. Reimer notes, “A characteristic of missions in the
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next century will be the ability to quickly transition
between the use of lethal and nonlethal means.”33 This could
create confusion on the part of subordinate leaders and their
soldiers over which level of force they should apply. This
suggests that nonlethal force cannot be used in isolation.
Forces must have immediate recourse to more lethal force,
should it be required.
Cautions notwithstanding, nonlethality will play a
significant role in small-scale conflicts. Most of the concepts
discussed above for FDOs and MOOTW will apply, but the
overriding consideration for small-scale conflicts will be to
facilitate timely mission accomplishment while controlling
and ultimately reducing the level and scope of violence. In
most small-scale conflicts, the commander first should
employ nonlethal capabilities in combination with lethal
weapons to contain the conflict and establish conditions for
mission accomplishment. Once that is accomplished, the
commander should begin a transition to purely nonlethal
force to set the stage for turnover of the situation to the host
nation and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Nonlethality can be used, therefore, both to supplement
and supplant lethal weapons in small-scale conflicts.
Nonlethality should be used without accompanying lethal
weapons in situations where the use of lethal weapons
would not be necessary for mission accomplishment, and
where the use of lethal weapons would be unacceptably
escalatory. That is, lethal weapons should not be used in
situations where nonlethal capabilities employed in
conjunction with nonmilitary instruments of national
power would be sufficient for mission accomplishment.
In situations where lethal force is required, it should be
supplemented by nonlethal capabilities. The combined
application of lethal and nonlethal force can facilitate more
efficient and effective mission accomplishment for two
reasons. First, nonlethal capabilities can mitigate and
ameliorate adverse effects of lethal force such as collateral
damage, noncombatant casualties, and perceptions of
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heavy-handedness. These features of nonlethal force would
be particularly critical for military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT) or other situations in which combatants are
interspersed with noncombatants. Second, nonlethal
capabilities can enhance the effectiveness of lethal force by
disabling enemy personnel and equipment, creating
lucrative targets, affording more precise engagements,
inhibiting enemy sustainment efforts, and eroding the
enemy’s will to fight. For small-scale conflicts, nonlethal
capabilities should figure prominently in operational
designs that seek to apply precisely the right type and
amount of force when and where needed.
Major Theater War. One might not expect nonlethal
capabilities to play a substantial role in major theater war
with its emphasis on the application of overwhelming force
to rapidly defeat the enemy. The idea of minimizing force is
not a dominant consideration. Nonetheless, the principles of
military necessity and proportionality apply to major
theater war as much as to less violent operations. Major
theater war would strain national capabilities and call for
the most efficient application of all available and suitable
military systems. Consequently, nonlethality should be
part of theater campaign design in ways that enhance the
effectiveness of lethal weapons. In particular, nonlethality
may augment destruction of some key targets, and help in
situations where enemy combatants are mixed with
civilians. The nonlethal systems used in major theater war
would range from those with short-term effects used in
urban combat, up to those with permanent effects used for
strategic strikes. The intensity of effect for nonlethals used
in major theater war would, of course, generally be higher
than those used in MOOTW. (See Figure 4.)
If the United States becomes involved in a major theater
war in coming years, urban engagements may pose some of
the greatest challenges. Cities will often be the strategic
centers of gravity, since that is where most people and
wealth will be. Combat will occur there both because of the
concentration of national power and because enemies,
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recognizing the complexity of urban warfare, will choose to
fight there as an asymmetric counter to American prowess
in open terrain.
Stand-off, lethal methods will not be appropriate in
urban engagements, even if they are substantially more
precise than those available today. Military operations in
urban terrain (MOUT) will involve face-to-face confrontations and close-in solutions. Nonlethal capabilities might
enable the U.S. military to remove enemy forces from urban
environments with minimal civilian casualties and limited
risk to American forces. If nonlethal weapons were
developed which were capable of temporary incapacitation,
separating combatants and noncombatants would entail
much less risk to U.S. forces. To hold areas already cleared,
nonlethal weapons could limit the risk to U.S. soldiers
performing sentry duties and lessen the chances that
noncombatants wandering through cleared areas would be
harmed. For refugee control, nonlethals could help prevent
riots and assist U.S. forces in dealing with any combatants
that attempted to hide among refugees.
Even outside urban combat, nonlethality can mitigate
the undesirable side effects of lethal weapons and modulate
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the punishment inflicted upon an aggressor. For example, if
the intent is to limit the scope and/or duration of the effects
of war on an enemy, the theater commander might employ
point-target nonlethals such as vehicle disablers and
anti-mobility systems. This approach would facilitate
post-war reconstruction and restoration of essential
services in situations where replacement of the war-making
enemy government is a U.S. objective. On the other hand, if
the objective is to reverse an aggression and inflict
punishment on an aggressor, nonlethal capabilities which
are more widespread or semi-permanent in their effects
might be appropriate. Of course, if the United States desired
to mete out extreme punishment, it could apply purely
destructive lethal force. In any case, the availability of
nonlethal capabilities that provide a continuum of force
between diplomatic persuasion and lethal force would
provide increased options to strategists and operational
planners.
Direct Action Missions. Another category of operations
for which nonlethal capabilities have potential utility are
those referred to as direct action missions. They may
include strategic preemption, hostage rescue, and counterterrorism.
Strategic Preemption. Nonlethality could be a central
feature of systems the United States uses for strategic
preemption, whether to control the proliferation or
deployment of weapons of mass destruction, to counter
narcotrafficking or terrorism, or to launch a spoiling or
disarming attack to prevent imminent conventional
aggression.34 Strategic preemption sometimes entails a
breech of national sovereignty, albeit a necessary one. To be
able to conduct such missions with limited casualties would
greatly aid national leaders who must decide if the risk of
inaction justifies the political costs of preemption.
Strategic preemption may involve standoff, airdelivered systems or those used by special forces in close
proximity to the target. Unlike the nonlethal weapons
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described in DODD 3000.3, those used for strategic
preemption may have relatively irreversible effects on
materiel. (See Figure 5.). The concept for employment of
nonlethal capabilities against weapons of mass destruction
must minimize the risk of precipitating the deadly effects of
the targeted weapons while ensuring the weapons are no
longer usable or accessible by their owners. The concept
might consider gluing or otherwise sealing the entrances to
facilities shut, use of chemical, electronic, or acoustic
systems to damage electrical or electronic control systems,
or making the weapons otherwise inaccessible to their
owners. When directed at conventional forces or the power
bases of narcotraffickers, nonlethal capabilities would focus
primarily on permanent damage or destruction to certain
types of equipment and facilities and might take the form of
material embrittlement, decay of rubber, or fuel contamination.35
Hostage Rescue and Counterterrorism. Hostage rescue
and counterterrorism situations are distinct military
operations. Nonetheless, with respect to the use of
nonlethal capabilities, they are sufficiently similar to be
discussed together and addressed by similar concepts. The
paramount concern for such operations is the precise control
and application of force. The hostage takers and terrorists
must be immediately identified and neutralized without
Certain
death
Some
Extent deaths
of
Very
Damage unpleasant

Strategic
Preemption

Minimal
(nuisance)
Diplomacy, economic sanctions, psychological operations

Very short

Reversible

Length of Effect
Figure 5.
28

Permanent

unnecessary harm to hostages or victims. That is best
accomplished by virtually if not physically segregating the
hostage takers or terrorists from the hostages or victims.
In practice, however, that is not often possible.
Consequently, a concept of using nonlethal capabilities to
incapacitate hostage takers and terrorists without
inflicting more than temporary discomfort upon the
hostages or victims slowly has been evolving. To date, the
efficacy of the concept has been constrained by the lack of
suitable nonlethal capabilities. As more interest in
nonlethal technologies is generated and new capabilities
are developed and fielded, this concept can mature. The
result will be a substantial reduction in the risks associated
with hostage rescues and counterterrorist operations, and
increased probability of success.
Rules of Engagement. A discussion of operational
concepts for the employment of nonlethal capabilities would
be incomplete without addressing their impact on rules of
engagement (ROE). Fundamentally, rules of engagement
should seek to match the level of force called for in a
situation to the means available for generating force. Stated
differently, a situation creates a “military necessity” for a
given level of force to accomplish a presumably legitimate
mission. Service members must be able to generate force
“proportionate” to the necessity. The problem that confronts
commanders in military operations below the level of major
war is that the appropriate level of force often falls within
the interstices of available means, and a good match is not
possible.36 The alternatives are either to risk mission failure
due to reluctance to generate the force required, or to risk
inflicting unacceptable injury, death, or collateral damage.
Military leaders have labored long to craft ROE to bridge
this gap—to connect what cannot be connected. Their
dilemma is that they are faced with two independent
variables beyond their control: available weapons systems
and force requirements generated by the situation and
mission. Some analysts and military officers suggest that
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establishing new ROE for nonlethal capabilities will create
decision variables too complex for service members to
manage. Actually, the reverse is true. Not providing ROE
that match a service member’s capability to respond with
the level of force called for by the situation creates an
insoluble situation that at best promotes mission failure
and at worst results in excessive force and unnecessary
injury or death. The addition of nonlethal capabilities to the
options available to commanders will allow more precise
tailoring of ROE for MOOTW as well as for small-scale
conflicts.
When reviewing the rules established regarding the use
of force by the U.S. military and various law enforcement
agencies, one rule is universal—deadly force should not be
used when nonlethal force could reasonably be expected to
suffice.37 This rule should serve as the “prime directive” in
crafting ROE for the use of nonlethal capabilities. Given
that various nonlethal capabilities range along a spectrum
of force that falls between persuasive diplomacy and lethal
force, it follows that ROE should provide that the level and
type of nonlethal force applied should be the minimum
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of mission
success and acceptable risk. These general prescriptions
provide a foundation for the development of more specific
ROE and operational procedures tailored to specific
situations and capabilities.
There are additional generalizations. For example, the
rules of engagement for the use of nonlethal capabilities
should provide for the seamless integration of lethal and
nonlethal weapons within the design of the operation. Rules
of engagement should discourage use of nonlethal
capabilities in situations where escalation to lethal force
would be both certain and imminent. Nonlethality,
particularly in MOOTW, may be the preferred option, but it
should never be the only option. Additionally, ROE for
nonlethal capabilities must not signal that the use of lethal
weapons has been ruled out. Furthermore, ROE should
place the decision as to whether lethal or nonlethal means
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should be used at the lowest possible level. In general, the
use of nonlethality for strategic preemption will require
national level decision. There must be plans for integrating
nonlethality into campaign plans for major theater war in
accordance with the theater commander’s intent. Finally,
the actual use of nonlethality in MOOTW should be left to
the discretion of tactical commanders.
Conclusions.
The strongest proponents of nonlethality contend that it
portends a fundamental shift in the nature of warfare.
Nonlethality, David A. Morehouse writes, “is a revolutionary concept that can guide the international community
into a new world order.”38 The critics of nonlethality, on the
other hand, consider it a dangerous Pandora’s Box that will
lower thresholds for the use of force. They reason that
policymakers will be tempted by nonlethal capabilities to
employ U.S. forces in operations that could escalate into
warfare without adequate discussion and debate. We
suggest that the utility of nonlethality in protecting and
advancing U.S. national security objectives falls somewhere
between these two extremes.
With appropriate forms of technology, doctrine,
operational concepts, and rules of engagement, nonlethality
could increase the utility of the U.S. armed forces during
this era of ambiguous conflict. Nonlethality could provide
political decisionmakers and military commanders with
means to dominate the portion of the spectrum of force that
lies between diplomacy and lethality. In doing so, they will
be better able to apply the precise psychological pressure
required to modify an adversary’s behavior in a certain way.
Nonlethality can be used to deter or preempt conflict,
separate belligerents and allow for “cooling off,” encourage
negotiation, protect noncombatants, facilitate disaster
relief and humanitarian assistance operations, enhance the
effectiveness of lethal weapons and other instruments of
national power, and reduce risks to U.S. forces.
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Nonetheless, there are several cautions associated with
the use of nonlethality. The apparent avoidance of political
risks that nonlethality provides can delay necessary debate
and the making of tough policy decisions. The pursuit of
nonlethality by the United States could be viewed as
hegemonic by other countries. Nonlethality could
compromise the principle of military necessity if it
encourages field commanders to be less discriminating in
distinguishing military targets from nonmilitary locations
and populations. Finally, nonlethality could lead to
increased violations of sovereignty.
From an operational perspective, nonlethality appears
to have more applicability at the lower end of the conflict
spectrum. Nonlethal capabilities should be included in
plans for the application of flexible deterrent options. In
that role, nonlethality can add to the effectiveness of
diplomatic, economic, informational, and other military
FDOs. It is critical, however, that nonlethal FDOs be crafted
to avoid inadvertently placing the United States on the
“slippery slope” to involvement in a series of peripheral
bloodlettings that might undercut American public support
for a strategy of global engagement. In that regard, it will
sometimes be necessary to clearly announce that U.S. forces
will resort to lethal force if nonlethality fails to have the
desired effect. In other situations, it will be more prudent to
create deliberate ambiguity on the willingness to resort to
deadly force.
Within the context of MOOTW, nonlethality should be
considered for force and site protection, riot and crowd
control, separation of belligerents, interdiction of resupply
efforts or offensives, operational persuasion, and security
assistance. For small-scale conflicts, nonlethality can help
insure mission accomplishment while controlling and
ultimately reducing the level of violence. Although
nonlethality will be most useful at the lower end of the
conflict spectrum, it has significant applicability for major
theater warfare. It that regard, nonlethality should be
employed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
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lethal weapons. Nonlethal capabilities also can be used to
measure a certain dose of punishment to aggressor states
and to facilitate post-war reconstruction. Finally, nonlethal
capabilities can be used for direct action missions that
might include strategic preemption, hostage rescue, and
counterterrorist operations.
Nonlethality will not create difficult ROE problems.
Rather, nonlethality will enable commanders to tailor
better rules and operational procedures to ensure force
proportionate to that necessitated by the situation and
mission is available and usable. Consequently, decisions
that must be made by field forces concerning the
appropriate level of force to be applied will be less
ambiguous. Rather than adding complexity to ROE issues,
nonlethality should be seen as providing unprecedented
fidelity in the application of force to accomplish a wider set
of legitimate missions.
Nonlethality will not remove violence from armed
conflict. Nonlethal capabilities will not obviate lethal forces,
at least not for the foreseeable future. In fact, in some cases,
nonlethality should be used to enhance the effects of lethal
weapons. Still, nonlethality can sufficiently increase the
utility of American land power in this era of ambiguity and
uncertainty to warrant its pursuit.
Recommendations.

•
•

The U.S. armed forces, particularly the Army and
Marines, should develop operational concepts for the
employment of nonlethality.
These operational concepts should not be constrained
by extant capabilities or those under development.
The concepts must drive technological investigations.
In particular, research is needed on wide-area, standoff nonlethal systems, and on variable intensity
nonlethal systems so that commanders have a true
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rheostatic capability rather than an “either/or” choice
between lethal and nonlethal means.

•

•

•

•

The Army should begin research and development of
data bases to support assessments of the psychological impact which certain actions are likely to have
in certain cultures. This will help commanders to
select the appropriate circumstances for the use of
nonlethal weapons and guide the research and
development community as they refine nonlethal
weapons, thus linking operational imperatives and
technology.
While the regional combatant commanders and
services decided that the Standing Rules of
Engagement should not be modified to account for
specific weapons systems such as nonlethals, this
issue may need to be revisited. Once advanced
operational nonlethal concepts and technology are in
place, the Standing Rules Of Engagement again
should be reviewed for possible modification or
supplementation to ensure full realization of the
additional capabilities nonlethality has to offer.
Joint doctrine setting forth the operational concepts
for the use of nonlethality in design of operations
should be developed and promulgated. Service
doctrine should follow suit.
Policymakers should remain ever-mindful of the
cautions associated with the application of nonlethality.
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APPENDIX
NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES

In the broadest sense, U.S. Department of Defense Joint
Non-Lethal Weapons Program distinguishes two “core
capabilities” for nonlethal weapons:
Counter-personnel capabilities including crowd
control, incapacitation of individuals, denial of access, and
clearing of facilities and structures;
Counter-materiel capabilities, including area denial
and the disabling or neutralization of equipment or
facilities.
Based on requirements passed from field commanders,
current Department of Defense research and development
focuses on:
Acoustics: Systems that deter, disorient, disperse,
disable, and incapacitate individuals and deny access to
areas.
Entanglements: Systems that deter, detain, disable,
and often deny access and mobility to individuals through
entanglement nets.
Kinetics: A family of direct fire, low hazard, nonshrapnel producing munitions and systems which will
produce less-than-lethal trauma upon impact. This may
include a modular crowd control munition based on the
claymore mine dispenser which uses stinging rubber balls, a
66 mm system that can fire a “stingball” as an alternative to
the current smoke grenade, and various other types of
rubber and sponge projectiles.
Riot control agents: Crowd control systems that
confuse, stop, neutralize, disable, disorient, distract,
disperse, or isolate groups of people or potential threats.
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Vehicle stoppers: Mechanical and directed energy
systems that incapacitate vehicles, vessels, and aircraft.
Other nonlethal technologies are considered feasible
and potentially effective. Some of these may be rejected on
legal or ethical grounds, technological infeasibility, or
failure to meet military needs. Others may enter the
inventory of the U.S. military in coming decades. These
technologies include:
Computer viruses that can cause computer systems or
networks to malfunction, be controlled by external forces, or
be destroyed.
Morphing which is the use of electronic audio and video
media to simulate speech and mannerisms of an individual.
Conductive particles that can induce short circuits in
electrical or electronic equipment.
Depolymerizing agents that cause polymers to
dissolve or decompose.
Liquid metal embrittlement that significantly
reduces the strength of metals or alloys.
Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulses that explode
ammunition dumps or paralyze unprotected electronic
systems.
Petroleum contaminators that make fuel unusable.
Supercaustics that corrode, degrade, or rot structural
materials.
Superlubricants that cause a lack of traction.
Superadhesives that impede mobility by being sticky
or space-filling.
Isotropic radiators that dazzle people or optical
sensors with bright light.
Lasers that disable or destroy optical sensors or,
potentially, blind people.
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Pulsing lights that disorient or confuse personnel and
degrade optical sensors.
Calmative agents that temporarily incapacitate
personnel.
Carbon particles that short-circuit generators or
electronic equipment.
High-power microwaves which destroy electronic
microcircuits through pulsating energy emissions.
Climate control technology.
Electric stun guns.
Visual stimulus, illusion, and obstruction such as
holograms.
Optical coatings deposited on optical sensors or
viewing ports.
Soil destabilization substances that cause soil to
become soft or unstable.
Malodorous substances that cause discomfort to
personnel.
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